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Traditional evolutionary game theory explores frequency dependent selection
in well-mixed populations without spatial or stochastic eﬀects. But recently
there has been much interest in studying evolutionary game dynamics in spatial
settings, on lattices and other graphs. Here we present an analytic approach
for stochastic evolutionary game dynamics on the simplest possible graph,
the cycle. For three diﬀerent update rules, called ‘birth-death’, ‘death-birth’
and ‘imitation’, we derive exact conditions for natural selection to favor one
strategy over another. As speciﬁc examples, we consider a coordination game
and the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the latter, selection can favor cooperators
over defectors for ‘death-birth’ updating and ‘imitation’. We also study the
case where the replacement graph of evolutionary updating remains a cycle,
but the interaction graph for playing the game is a complete graph. In this
setting, all three update rules lead to identical conditions in the limit of weak
selection, where we ﬁnd the ‘1/3-law’ of well mixed populations.
Keywords: evolutionary dynamics, social networks, ﬁxation probability, spatial games,
evolutionary graph theory, prisoner’s dilemma, frequency dependent selection
1. INTRODUCTION
Game theory was invented by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) as a mathematical
approach to understand strategic and economic decisions of humans. Hamilton (1967),
1Trivers (1971) and Maynard Smith & Price (1973) brought game theory to biology. In-
stead of analyzing the interaction between two rational players, evolutionary game theory
explores the dynamics of a population of players under the inﬂuence of natural selection
(Maynard Smith 1982). In the classical setting of the replicator equation, the population
size is inﬁnite and interactions are equally likely between any two individuals (Taylor &
Jonker 1978, Hofbauer et al 1979, Zeeman 1980). Each individual obtains an average pay-
oﬀ which is interpreted as biological ﬁtness: strategies reproduce according to their payoﬀ.
Successful strategies spread and eliminate less successful ones. The payoﬀ depends on the
frequency of strategies in the population. Hence, natural selection is frequency dependent.
The replicator equation is deeply connected to the concept of an evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS) or Nash equilibrium. In the framework of the replicator equation, an ESS
cannot be invaded by any mutant strategy (Hofbauer & Sigmund 1998). For recent books
on game theory and evolutionary game theory we refer to Fudenberg & Tirole (1991),
Binmore (1994), Weibull (1995), Samuelson (1997), Fudenberg & Levine (1998), Hofbauer
& Sigmund (1998), Gintis (2000), and Cressman (2003). Recent reviews of evolutionary
game dynamics are Hofbauer & Sigmund (2003) and Nowak & Sigmund (2004).
While the traditional approach studies well-mixed, inﬁnitely large populations, there
have also been considerable eﬀorts to characterize game dynamics in spatial systems and
other networks (Nowak & May 1992, 1993, Ellison 1993, Herz 1994, Lindgren & Nordahl
1994, Nowak et al 1994, Killingback & Doebeli 1996, Nakamaru et al 1997, 1998, Epstein
1998, van Baalen & Rand 1998, Eshel et al 1999, Page et al 2000, Skyrms & Pemantle 2000,
Abramson & Kuperman 2001, Irwin & Taylor 2001, Ebel & Bornholdt 2002, Hauert et al
2002, Brandt et al 2003, Le Galliard et al 2003, Hauert & Szab´ o 2003, Hauert & Doebeli
2004, Ifti et al 2004, Szab´ o & Vukov 2004, Traulsen & Claussen 2004, Hauert & Szab´ o
2005, Nakamaru & Iwasa 2005, Santos et al 2006ab). One observation was that cooperators
and defectors can coexist indeﬁnitely in spatial settings of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Nowak
& May 1992). This ‘spatial reciprocity’ is a consequence of cooperators forming clusters,
which can lead to a higher payoﬀ for cooperators in the interior of clusters than for defectors
at the boundary.
Ellison (1993) has studied coordination games in spatial settings and found that
2localized interactions facilitate faster convergence than global interactions. Nakamaru et
al (1997, 1998) have studied the interaction between tit-for-tat and always-defect in the
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma on lattices. They have observed that ‘fertility’ selection is less
favorable for cooperation than ‘mortality’ selection. Nakamaru and Iwasa (2005) analyze
the evolution of altruism in a spatially structured population with punishment (Fehr &
Gaechter 2000, Sigmund et al 2001).
There have also been extensions of the replicator equation into continuous space.
This approach uses partial diﬀerential equations to describe evolutionary game dynamics
(Vickers 1989, Hutson & Vickers 1992, Cressman & Vickers 1997). There is a long standing
tradition of studying spatial eﬀects in ecology (Levin & Paine 1974, Durrett & Levin 1994,
Hassell et al 1994). For a recent review of population biology and network structure see
May (2006).
In evolutionary games in ﬁnite populations, stochasticity plays an important role
(Nowak et al 2004, Taylor et al 2004, Traulsen et al 2005, Imhof & Nowak 2006). The most
crucial quantities are the ﬁxation probabilities. If a single individual playing a strategy A
is added to a population playing strategy B, then there is a certain probability that A will
generate an oﬀspring lineage which will eventually take over the entire population. For
a neutral mutant, this ﬁxation probability is given by the inverse of the population size,
1/N. If the ﬁxation probability of A is greater than 1/N, then selection favors the ﬁxation
of this strategy. The analysis of evolutionary game dynamics in ﬁnite populations requires
a comparison of the ﬁxation probabilities of the two strategies with each other and with
1/N.
Lieberman et al (2005) show how to calculate the ﬁxation probability of a randomly
placed mutant on various graphs. The traditional well-mixed population is the special case
of a complete graph (all individuals are connected) with identical weights. For constant
(instead of frequency dependent) selection, all graphs which are circulations lead to the
same ﬁxation probabilities as the complete graph. A graph is a circulation if for each vertex
the sum over all incoming weights equals the sum over all outgoing weights. Lieberman
et al (2005) also discuss frequency dependent selection (evolutionary games) on directed
cycles.
3Ohtsuki et al (2006) study the evolution of cooperation on a large variety of graphs.
Using pair approximation (Matsuda et al 1987, 1992, Harada et al 1995), they ﬁnd that
selection favors the evolution of cooperation if b/c > k. The beneﬁt to cost ratio of the
altruistic act has to exceed the (average) number of neighbors per individual. Computer
simulations suggest that this very simple rule works well for many diﬀerent graphs including
lattices, regular graphs, random regular graphs and scale-free networks. Of course, pair
approximation makes certain assumptions that may or may not hold in a particular setting.
Therefore, the attempt of this paper is to derive exact results for the ﬁxation probabilities
of evolutionary games on a simple family of graphs, the cycle. In these cases, direct
calculations succeed, because a single invader always leads to one cluster that does not
fragment into pieces. A cycle is a regular graph with k = 2; each individual has exactly
two neighbors. Therefore, we expect that b/c > 2 will be a decisive rule for the evolution
of cooperation on cycles.
In Section 2, we introduce the basic rules of the game, consider three diﬀerent update
mechanism for the evolutionary dynamics and present results for general two person games.
In Section 3, we study coordination games on cycles. In Section 4, we study the evolution
of cooperation. Section 5 assumes that the updating (or the evolutionary competition) still
occurs between nearest neighbor on a cycle, but the payoﬀ of each individual is derived
from random interactions among the whole population. In this case, we ﬁnd that all three
update mechanisms lead to the same criterion. Throughout the paper we state the crucial
results in the main text and show their derivations in the Appendix.
2. GAMES ON CYCLES
Consider a game between two strategies A and B. Denote by a,b,c and d the payoﬀ
for A versus A, A versus B, B versus A and B versus B, respectively. The payoﬀ matrix
is given by
0
@
A B
A a b
B c d
1
A (1)
Strategy A is a strict Nash equilibrium if a > c. In this case, strategy A is also evolu-
tionarily stable, which means that B cannot invade A in an inﬁnitely large, well-mixed
4population. Similarly, strategy B is a strict Nash equilibrium and evolutionarily stable if
b < d. If a > c and b < d then both strategies are strict Nash equilibria. In this case, a
well-mixed population will either converge to one strategy or the other depending on the
initial frequencies of the strategies. The strategy with the bigger basin of attraction is
called ‘risk-dominant’. A simple calculation shows that A is risk dominant if a+b > c+d.
If a > c and b > d then A dominates B, which means that any mixed population
will converge to a homogenous state using only strategy A. All these results are based
on deterministic evolutionary game dynamics in inﬁnitely large, well-mixed populations
without spatial eﬀects.
Real biological populations are neither well-mixed nor inﬁnite. Let us therefore
consider a structured, ﬁnite population with individuals i = 1,..,N. The rate at which
individual i plays the game with j is given by hij. The rate at which an oﬀspring of
individual i replaces j is given by gij. The matrix G = [gij] speciﬁes the ‘replacement
graph’, while the matrix H = [hij] speciﬁes the ‘interaction graph’ (Fig. 1). In a series of
other papers (Ohtsuki et al 2006, Ohtsuki & Nowak 2006), we have used pair-approximation
and computer simulation to study evolutionary games on a large variety of graphs. Here
instead we derive exact results for the simple case that G and H are identical and given
by cycles with equal weights.
Each player is interacting with its two immediate neighbors. The payoﬀs from these
two interactions are added up. A parameter w measures the intensity of selection. The
ﬁtness of an individual is given by 1 − w + wP, where P is the individual’s payoﬀ. The
case w = 1 denotes strong selection: ﬁtness equals payoﬀ. The case w << 1 denotes weak
selection: the payoﬀ from the game represents only a small contribution to ﬁtness. For
w = 0, we obtain neutral drift; all strategies have the same ﬁtness. It is interesting to note
that for the traditional replicator equation, the intensity of selection cancels out, but for
stochastic game dynamics the intensity of selection plays an important role (Nowak et al
2004). Often simple and illuminating results arise in the limit of weak selection, w → 0.
We consider three diﬀerent update rules: (i) ’birth-death’ (BD) means that an
individual is selected for reproduction proportional to ﬁtness and the oﬀspring replaces
a randomly chosen neighbor; (ii) ’death-birth’ (DB) means that a random individual is
5eliminated, and the neighbors compete for the empty site proportional to their ﬁtness; (ii)
‘imitation’ (IM) means that a random individual is chosen to update its strategy; it will
either stay with its own strategy or imitate one of the neighbors’ strategy proportional to
ﬁtness.
Imagine now that a single A individual is added to a population of N − 1 B indi-
viduals. The A individual could die before reproducing or produce a lineage of A, which
becomes extinct after some time. In both cases, the population returns to a state of ‘all-B’.
The other possibility is that A produces a lineage which will eventually take over the entire
population, which means that B becomes extinct. In this case, the population will end up
in the state ‘all-A’. Denote by ρA the probability that a single A individual will take over
a population of B. Denote by ρB the probability that a single B individual will take over
a population of A. The quantities ρA and ρB are called the ﬁxation probabilities of A and
B, respectively.
A neutral mutant has ﬁxation probability 1/N. Therefore, if ρA > 1/N then se-
lection favors the ﬁxation of A. If ρA < 1/N then selection opposes the ﬁxation of A. If
ρA > ρB then selection favors A over B.
For strong selection (w = 1) and large population size (N → ∞), we ﬁnd that
selection favors the ﬁxation of A and opposes the ﬁxation of B, ρA > 1/N > ρB, if
BD : a + b > c + d
DB : a(a + b) > (c + d)d
IM : (3a + b)(a + b) > (c + d)(c + 3d)
(2)
For the limit of weak selection (w → 0) and large population size (N → ∞), we
ﬁnd that ρA > 1/N > ρB, if
BD : a + b > c + d
DB : 3a + b > c + 3d
IM : 5a + 3b > 3c + 5d
(3)
Interestingly, for BD updating, we ﬁnd the same condition for weak and strong
selection, and this condition is equivalent to risk-dominance. For DB and IM updating,
6however, there are diﬀerent conditions for weak and strong selection, and neither of those
conditions are equivalent to risk dominance.
In the limit of weak selection, we can also derive simple conditions for any given
population size, N. We ﬁnd that ρA > ρB if
BD : (N − 2)a + Nb > Nc + (N − 2)d
DB : (3N − 8)a + Nb > Nc + (3N − 8)d
IM : (5N − 12)a + 3Nb > 3Nc + (5N − 12)d
(4)
For large N, we recover the conditions given by (3). In contrast to (2) and (3), however,
inequalities (4) do not specify whether ρA or ρB are greater or smaller than 1/N. These
conditions are derived in the Appendix.
3. PARETO EFFICIENCY AND RISK DOMINANCE
Consider a coordination game. Strategies A and B are strict Nash equilibria. We
have a > c and b < d. Suppose B is risk-dominant, which means that a + b < c + d. But
A is Pareto-eﬃcient, which means that a > d. Hence, strategy B has the bigger basin of
attraction, but a homogeneous population of A has a higher payoﬀ than a homogeneous
population of B.
For BD updating, we always have that ρA < ρB, which means that the ﬁxation
probability of A is smaller than that of B. BD updating on the cycle favors risk-dominance
over Pareto-eﬃciency. For DB and IM updating, however, it is possible that the Pareto
eﬃcient strategy is favored by selection. A particular example is given by the payoﬀ matrix
0
@
A B
A 10 1
B 9 3
1
A (5)
Here A is pareto-eﬃcient, while B is risk-dominant. Nevertheless, the conditions (2) and
(3) hold for DB and IM updating, which implies that ρA > 1/N > ρB for large N.
Therefore, these two update rules can lead to eﬃcient outcomes for coordination games on
cycles.
4. THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA ON A CYCLE
7As a speciﬁc example, consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma, which is given by the payoﬀ
matrix
0
@
C D
C R S
D T P
1
A (6)
The ranking of the payoﬀ values is T > R > P > S. The ‘temptation’ to defect, T, is
greater then the ‘reward’ for mutual cooperation, R, which is greater than the ‘punish-
ment’, P, for mutual defection, which is greater than the ‘sucker’s payoﬀ’, S. Since T > R
and P > S, cooperators, C, are dominated by defectors, D. The traditional replicator
dynamics and stochastic dynamics in a well-mixed population of ﬁnite size (Nowak et al,
2004) both lead to defection. Moreover, we have R + S < T + P, which means that BD
updating on the cycle also favors defectors over cooperators.
But for DB or IM updating, it is possible that cooperators are favored over defectors.
A numerical example is given by
0
@
C D
C 10 1
D 11 2
1
A (7)
For this payoﬀ matrix, the ﬁxation probability of a single cooperator, ρC, is greater than
1/N, while the ﬁxation probability of a single defector, ρD, is less than 1/N, for strong
and weak selection, for DB and IM updating. Therefore, evolutionary game dynamics on
cycles can favor cooperation over defection in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
The intuitive reason for this ﬁnding is the following. On a cycle an invasion attempt
by a single cooperator leads to a single cluster of cooperators. The question is whether the
boundary between cooperators and defectors moves in favor of cooperators or not. For BD
updating only the payoﬀ of the two individuals (one cooperator and one defector) right at
the boundary aﬀect the stochastic dynamics. The cooperator always has a lower payoﬀ
than the defector. For DB and IM updating, the payoﬀs of the two individuals that are one
place removed from the boundary also aﬀect the dynamics. The ‘cooperator once removed’
always has a higher payoﬀ than the ‘defector once removed’. Therefore, it is possible that
the boundary moves in favor of cooperators (Fig 2).
8For a simpliﬁed Prisoner’s Dilemma given by two parameters denoting the cost, c,
and beneﬁt, b, of an altruistic act, we obtain the payoﬀ matrix
0
@
C D
C b − c −c
D b 0
1
A (8)
The conditions for strong selection (eq 2) cannot be used for this payoﬀ matrix, because
our analysis requires strictly positive ﬁtness values. The conditions for weak selection (eq
3) can be used, and here we obtain particularly elegant results. For BD updating we ﬁnd
that ρD > 1/N > ρC for any choice of b,c and N. Hence, for BD updating, cooperation
cannot evolve. For the other update mechanisms, however, we ﬁnd that ρC > 1/N > ρD
if
DB :
b
c
> 2 +
4
N − 4
IM :
b
c
> 4 +
18
N − 6
(9)
Note that the DB condition requires N > 4, while IM requires N > 6. For large N, we
obtain
DB :
b
c
> 2
IM :
b
c
> 4
(10)
These ﬁndings concur with the results obtained by pair-approximation for regular
graphs of degree k (Ohtsuki et al 2006). There we ﬁnd that DB updating favors cooperators
if b/c > k, while IM updating favors cooperators if b/c > k+2. Both results hold for large
N and weak selection. In this framework, we also ﬁnd that BD updating never favors
cooperators. Since the cycle has degree k = 2, the ﬁndings are in agreement.
5. LOCAL UPDATING BUT GLOBAL INTERACTION
Let us return to the general game between two strategies given by payoﬀ matrix
(1). Let us keep the cycle as the replacement graph, but use a complete interaction graph.
This means that updating occurs locally among nearest neighbors, but interactions are
globally. Remarkably, the following results hold for all three update mechanisms.
9In the limit of weak selection, we ﬁnd that ρA > ρB if
(N − 2)a + Nb > Nc + (N − 2)d. (11)
This inequality leads to a + b > c + d for large N. Furthermore, for large N, we ﬁnd that
ρA > 1/N if
a + 2b > c + 2d. (12)
This condition is the ‘1/3-rule’ which has been observed previously for well-mixed popu-
lations. If strategies A and B are best replies to themselves, then the standard replicator
equation has an unstable equilibrium at a frequency of A given by x∗
A = (d−b)/(a−b−c+d).
For stochastic game dynamics in a well-mixed population using the Moran process, the ﬁx-
ation probability ρA exceeds 1/N for weak selection and large population size if x∗
A < 1/3
(Nowak et al 2004). This ‘1/3-rule’ has also been obtained for frequency dependent selec-
tion in the Wright-Fisher process (Imhof & Nowak 2006).
6. CONCLUSION
We have studied stochastic evolutionary game dynamics on cycles, which represent
the simplest possible family of graphs. Each individual has two neighbors. A single
invader leads to a single cluster, which does not fragment into pieces. Therefore, the
transition matrix of the stochastic process is tri-diagonal, and the ﬁxation probability of
an invading strategy can be calculated explicitely. We consider three diﬀerent update
mechanisms for evolutionary dynamics, which we call ‘birth-death’ (BD), ‘death-birth’
(DB) and ‘imitation’ (IM). We explore the interaction between two strategies A and B
and present conditions for the ﬁxation probability ρA to be greater than ρB. We also
compare the two ﬁxation probabilities with 1/N, which is the ﬁxation probability of a
neutral mutant. For strong and weak selection, we ﬁnd simple conditions (eqs 2 and 3)
for large population size, N. For weak selection, we also ﬁnd simple conditions for any
population size (eq 4).
Note that none of these conditions reduce to the simple criteria of a strict Nash
equilibrium or an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Therefore, if A is a strict Nash
10equilibrium or an ESS, then it can still be the case that ρA is less than ρB and/or less
than 1/N.
In coordination games, BD updating always favors the risk dominant strategy, while
DB and IM updating can favor Pareto eﬃciency over risk dominance. In the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, BD updating always favors defectors, while DB and IM updating can favor
cooperators over defectors. In the latter case, a cooperator lineage starting from a single
cooperator invades a population of defectors with a probability of an advantageous mutant.
If cooperators pay a cost c for neighbors to receive a beneﬁt b, then DB updating favors the
evolution of cooperation if b/c > 2. For IM updating, we ﬁnd b/c > 4. These ﬁndings are
in agreement with the results obtained by pair approximation for regular graphs (Ohtsuki
et al 2006).
Note that these conditions are needed for the evolution of cooperation by ‘spatial
reciprocity’ alone (Nowak & May 1992) without any strategic complexity (Axelrod &
Hamilton 1981, Axelrod 1984) or reputation eﬀects (Nowak & Sigmund 2005). One can
also study the synergistic interaction between spatial reciprocity and direct or indirect
reciprocity, which will lead to less stringent conditions for the emergence and stability of
cooperation.
The intuitive reason for the diﬀerent behavior of the update mechanisms is illus-
trated in Figure 2. For BD updating, only the payoﬀ of the two individuals right at the
edge of a cluster plays a role, because two adjacent players directly compete for repro-
duction. The scale of interaction and competition is the same there. In contrast, for DB
and IM updating two individuals that are two-steps away from the edge of the cluster are
also involved in the competition; therefore, the scale of competition is larger than that of
interaction. For the struggle between cooperators and defectors, this is a crucial diﬀerence,
because right on the edge, the defector always has a higher payoﬀ than the cooperator, but
the cooperator that is once removed from the edge can have a higher payoﬀ still. There
is an interesting parallel between this observation and previous studies on viscous popula-
tions by Taylor 1992 and West et al 2002, who show that cooperation is favored when the
scale of competition is larger than the scale of interaction.
Studying games on graphs leads to an understanding of how population structure af-
11fects the outcome of evolutionary dynamics. Compared to most other evolutionary graphs,
the cycle has the particular advantage that the ﬁxation probabilities in frequency depen-
dent selection can be calculated exactly. Moreover, the cycle represents the extreme case
where the eﬀect of spatial structure on evolutionary dynamics is strongest. On the other
end of the spectrum is the well-mixed population, which is given by a complete graph
(where all individuals are connected to each other). For the Prisoner’s Dilemma, this
means that the condition b/c > 2 is a minimum requirement. All other structures will
demand a larger beneﬁt-to-cost ratio for the evolution of cooperation.
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Appendix A. DERIVATION OF THE RESULTS IN THE MAIN TEXT
Let us calculate ρA.
If the replacement graph is a cycle, then a single invader always leads a single
connected cluster. Therfore, in order to describe the stochastic process, it is suﬃcient to
count the number of players. Let i denote the number of A players. The state space of
the stochastic process is given by i = 0,..,N, where N is the total population size, which
is constant. At each time step, the variable i can at most change by one unit. Denote the
associated transition probabilities by λi = Prob.(i → i+1) and µi = Prob.(i → i−1). We
have 1 − λi − µi = Prob.(i → i).
There are two absorbing states i = N and i = 0. The former corresponds to ‘all-A’
and the latter to ‘all-B’. If the system has reached such a state it will stay there forever.
All other states are transient. Denote by ρA the probability to reach state i = N when
starting from i = 1. This quantity is the ﬁxation probability of A. Similarly, the ﬁxation
probability of B, ρB, denotes the probability to reach state i = 0 when starting from state
i = N − 1. A direct calculation (Karlin & Taylor 1975, Ewens 2004) shows that
ρA = 1
Áµ
1 +
N−1 X
j=1
j Y
i=1
µi
λi
¶
. (A.1)
12For the ratio of the two ﬁxation probabilities, we ﬁnd
ρA
ρB
=
N−1 Y
i=1
λi
µi
. (A.2)
Thus we need to calculate µi/λi for each i.
For convenience, deﬁne α,β,γ and δ as α = 1 − w + 2wa,β = 1 − w + 2wb,γ =
1 − w + 2wc and δ = 1 − w + 2wd. Here a,b,c,d are the entries of the payoﬀ matrix and
w denotes the intensity of selection.
(i) For BD updating we ﬁnd
µi/λi =
8
<
:
(γ + δ)/2β (i = 1)
(γ + δ)/(α + β) (2 ≤ i ≤ N − 2)
2γ/(α + β) (i = N − 1)
For strong selection (w = 1), the relative size of (γ + δ)/(α + β) compared to one is
important. If it is less than one, which is the case when a+b > c+d, then ρA is positive,
otherwise ρA = 0. For weak selection, we have
ρA =
1
N
+
w
2N2
½
(N2 − 3N + 2)a + (N2 + N − 2)b − (N2 − N + 2)c − (N2 − N − 2)d
¾
and
ρA
ρB
= 1 + w
©
(N − 2)a + Nb − Nc − (N − 2)d
ª
.
(ii) For DB updating we obtain
µi/λi =
8
> > > <
> > > :
(β + δ)/2β (i = 1)
[(γ + δ)/(α + β)] · [(α + β + 2δ)/(α + β + γ + δ)] (i = 2)
[(γ + δ)/(α + β)] · [(α + β + 2δ)/(2α + γ + δ)] (3 ≤ i ≤ N − 3)
[(γ + δ)/(α + β)] · [(α + β + γ + δ)/(2α + γ + δ)] (i = N − 2)
2γ/(α + γ) (i = N − 1)
For strong selection, ρA > 0 if and only if [(γ+δ)/(α+β)]·[(α+β+2δ)/(2α+γ+δ)] < 1,
which is equivalent to a(a + b) > (c + d)d. For weak selection, we have
ρA =
1
N
+
w
4N2
½
(3N2−11N +8)a+(N2+3N −8)b−(N2−3N +8)c−(3N2−5N −8)d
¾
13and
ρA
ρB
= 1 +
w
2
©
(3N − 8)a + Nb − Nc − (3N − 8)d
ª
.
(iii) Finally for IM updating we have
µi/λi =
8
> > > <
> > > :
[(γ + δ)/2β] · [(2β + γ + 3δ)/(2β + 2γ + 2δ)] (i = 1)
[(γ + δ)/(α + β)] · [(α + β + γ + 3δ)/(2α + 2β + γ + δ)] (i = 2)
[(γ + δ)/(α + β)] · [(α + β + γ + 3δ)/(3α + β + γ + δ)] (3 ≤ i ≤ N − 3)
[(γ + δ)/(α + β)] · [(α + β + 2γ + 2δ)/(3α + β + γ + δ)] (i = N − 2)
[2γ/(α + β)] · [(2α + 2β + 2γ)/(3α + β + 2γ)] (i = N − 1)
For strong selection, ρA > 0 holds if and only if [(γ +δ)/(α+β)]·[(α+β +γ +3δ)/(3α+
β +γ +δ)] < 1, which is equivalent to (3a+b)(a+b) > (c+d)(c+3d). For weak selection,
we have
ρA =
1
N
+
w
6N2
½
(5N2 − 17N + 12)a + (3N2 + 5N − 12)b
− (3N2 − 5N + 12)c − (5N2 − 7N − 12)d
¾
and
ρA
ρB
= 1 +
w
3
©
(5N − 12)a + 3Nb − 3Nc − (5N − 12)d
ª
.
If the interaction graph is complete, the total payoﬀs of A and B players are
eA(i) = (i − 1) · a + (N − i) · b
eB(i) = i · c + (N − i − 1) · d.
Substituting eA(i) for a,b and eB(i) for c,d leads to the results shown in the main text.
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Figure captions
Fig 1: Evolutionary games on graphs (or social networks) are characterized by an inter-
action graph and a replacement graph. The interaction graph speciﬁes who is interacting
with whom in terms of the evolutionary game that is under consideration. The replacement
graph speciﬁes the local neighborhood for updating the strategies (that is who competes
with whom in the selection process). The simplest geometry is that both the replacement
graph and the interaction graph are given by the same cycle, where each individual has
exactly two neighbors and there is no boundary. This one-dimensional geometry allows an
exact calculation which can be compared with approximative methods for other geometries.
Fig 2: For ‘birth-death’ (BD) updating, only the payoﬀ of the two individuals right at
the boundary between two clusters matter. The cluster of A players expands if a+b > c+d.
For ‘death-birth’ (DB) and ‘imitation’ (IM) updating, the payoﬀ of the four individuals
closest to the boundary between two clusters matters. The cluster of A players increases
19if 2a + (a + b) > (c + d) + 2d for DB updating and if 2a + 3(a + b) > 3(c + d) + 2d for
IM updating. All these results hold for weak selection. This ﬁgure gives the intuitive
explanation why cooperation can be favored over defection for DB and IM , but not for
BD updating.
Short title for page headings: games on cycles
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